This paper examines the ethical difficulties of organ donation from living donors and the problem ofcausing harm to patients or research subjects at their request. Graham Greene explored morally similar questions in his novella, The Tenth Man.
reason for this neglect may be the idiom in which bioethical questions are usually scripted and rehearsed, which is not well suited to the moral backdrop against which these issues are often played out. A vocabulary of rights and autonomy can be inadequate to represent the intimate bonds of family and friends, the delicate balance between sacrifice and self-interest, and the complex, often awkward relationship between doctors and organ donors or research subjects. In a moral framework shaped by respect for patient autonomy, whether or not to undergo risk or harm can come to seem a matter solely for patients to decide. The worries that many doctors feel about exposing willing subjects to harm or great risk can be frustratingly difficult to express.
What I would like to do here is to articulate some of these worries and to take the debate beyond the terms in which it is ordinarily expressed: as a conflict between the principles of beneficence and autonomy. To do this, I draw on Graham Greene's novella about shame and redemption, The Tenth Man. I will suggest that the issue of doing harm to willing subjects is more complicated than philosophers often acknowledge. I conclude with some practical recommendations for approaching the problem of patients who willingly expose themselves to harm or risk.
Volunteering to be harmed Sometimes competent adults volunteer for research or other sorts of medical procedure that are likely to harm them. Sometimes they volunteer for good reasons, other times for bad ones, but in either case a certain proportion of them are well aware of the harms they are risking and freely consent to them. One relatively common example is phase one clinical trials for chemotherapeutic drugs. Phase one trials test a drug's safety, and for chemotherapy they are generally done on patients with incurable cancer. Patients are at first given a small dose of the drug, which is increased until the patients begin to have toxic side-effects. However, with the toxicity comes only an exceedingly small chance of therapeutic benefit; for example, one study put the rate of complete remission at 0-16 per cent, and the likelihood of any objective response at all at less than 5 per cent (1) .
While some people see no problem in exposing competent adults to the risk of harm as long as they are informed and willing, many others feel vaguely uneasy about it. In fact, most people can imagine some limit to the degree of risk, and the severity of the harm, to which they would be willing to allow a subject to expose him or herself. Renee Fox reported a dramatic example at a conference sponsored by the University of Utah after the total artificial heart implantation in 1982 (2) After a number of months a guard enters the cell and tells the prisoners that there have been some murders in the town by the resistance movement. As a result, the commanders have ordered that one man out of every ten in the camp is to be shot. In a day's time, three of the thirty prisoners in Chavel's cell will be executed. The prisoners themselves must choose which three.
The prisoners decide to draw lots, and Chavel is among the three marked to die. Unlike the other condemned men, Chavel panics. He alone among the prisoners is a wealthy man, and fear-stricken, he begins to offer all his wealth and belongings to the other prisoners, if only one of them will change places with him. To the astonishtnent of all, one man accepts the offer. Michel Janvier says that if Chavel will sign over his house and all his wealth to him, so that he can in turn leave it to his impoverished mother and sister, he will take Chavel's place before the firing squad. He and Chavel draw up a will, and the next day, Janvier is shot.
This exchange takes place in only the first chapter of the book, but it is the story's defining event. The exchange was freely agreed by both men and witnessed by the other prisoners. Yet even though the deal was freely made, we know that Chavel was wrong to make it. Even though we might admire Janvier for sacrificing his life in order to provide for his mother and sister, we know that Chavel was wrong to take advantage of Janvier's selflessness.
Chavel knows this as well, and his actions torment him. The Tenth Man is a book about guilt and shame, and its plot turns on Chavel's efforts to purge himself of the guilt that he feels about bartering for his life. After the Nazis fall and Chavel is freed from prison, he is celebrating in a bar when he sees his face in a water decanter.
'It is the face of failure. It was odd, he thought, that one failure of nerve had ingrained the face as deeply as a tramp's, but, of course, he had the objectivity to tell himself, it wasn't one failure; it was a whole lifetime of preparation for the event. An artist paints his picture not in a few hours but in all the years of experience before he takes up the brush, and it is the same with failure' (4).
Harm and autonomy
Our ordinary moral and political vocabulary makes it natural to think of exchanges involving harm, such as the exchange made by Janvier and Chavel, as questions primarily of rights, freedom and fairness.
Yet very often our private reservations about harmful group.bmj.com on April 19, 2017 -Published by http://jme.bmj.com/ Downloaded from practices bear only a tangential relationship to these questions. That this is so can be seen in the awkward terms in which contemporary debates about harmful practices are often played out: whether people have a 'right' to act altruistically, or whether a research subject's 'freedom' is compromised by payment. In The Tenth Man, a prisoner objects to the deal struck by Chavel and Janvier on the grounds that it is not fair. But argued in these terms, his legitimate moral concerns are bound to be frustrated. As Janvier angrily replies: 'Why isn't it fair to let me do what I want? You'd all be rich men if you could, but you haven't the spunk. I see my chance and I take it. Fair, of course, it's fair. I'm going to die a rich man and anyone who thinks it isn't fair can rot' (4).
In a debate shaped by concepts like these, taking part in a harmful medical procedure or research protocol comes to be seen primarily as a matter of individual autonomy. Genuine worries about exposing a subject to harm are channelled into a debate about freedom of choice. When a surgical team at the University of Chicago transplanted a liver lobe from a living mother to her daughter with biliary atresia in 1989, critics of the procedure said that to offer a mother the chance to donate a liver lobe to her daughter was 'coercive', that no parent could refuse the offer (5) . The bonds between parent and child are so tight, it was said, that they constrict a parent's ability to make a free choice about risking the chance of harm.
While this criticism expresses some legitimate worries, it is aimed in the wrong direction. The most worrying part of living organ donation is not freedom of choice, though there is certainly the possibility of subtle coercion in such a situation. The worrying part is the chance of harm to a healthy donor: the liver transplant procedure was a new one, the risks potentially minimal but in many respects unknown (6) Paying for organs The nature of the doctor-patient relationship would probably also be altered if we were to commercialise the transfer of human organs, though just how it would be altered is not easy to predict. Organ transplantation is a practice in which a relatively small proportion of people ever take part, and it fits into our cultural landscape rather awkwardly. Both the language we use to describe the prelude to organ transplantation and our customary ways of proceeding suggest that we have begun thinking of the practice, however tentatively, as a variation on gift-giving (10) . We speak of 'donating' organs; promotional campaigns encourage potential blood donors to 'give the gift of life'.
However, the anthropology of a practice is altered by the exchange of money for what would otherwise be undertaken for reasons of affection, charity or duty. We make important distinctions between favours and services, gifts and merchandise (11) . To put a price on organs and sell them alters, in a rather uncomfortable way, both the way we think of the organs themselves and the relationship between the organ donor and the recipient. The donor becomes a vendor, the recipient a customer, the organ a commodity, and the relationship a contract. Many doctors would be uncomfortable with this commercialized version of transplantation, even those who doubt that generosity can meet the demand for organs.
The Tenth Man also reminds us that few decisions affect only the person who makes them. Chavel eventually takes a job under an assumed name as a handyman at his old estate, which is now owned by Janvier's sister and mother. There he realizes how much his exchange has hurt Janvier's sister, who despises the unknown man whose bargaining led to her brother's death. She wonders how Janvier could have ever thought that she and her mother would have preferred the wealth they have inherited to his life.
That a person's decision to harm himself deeply affects a circle of people far beyond him seems so obvious a part of ordinary life that it seems almost trite to emphasize it here, but a recognition of this point is often strangely absent in philosophical writing. To emphasize the broader effects of a person's actions is not, of course, to deny that a person's liberty rights entitle him to harm himself if he wishes. It is rather to point out that these actions often extract a heavy toll on those who love and care about the agent, and that for this reason, they are not ethically uncomplicated. If I pay another person to harm himself for my sake, or if I agree to use him in a risky research protocol, I must recognize that my actions might very likely damage his family and friends very much. And even while I might defend that person's right to make the decision to harm himself, I would feel very awkward trying to defend myself against the criticism of his family and friends, whose resentment most of us could readily understand.
Finally, it is important to realize that the doctor is not a mere instrument of the patient's wishes. Analyses of living organ donation and risky clinical research are often simplified needlessly by a failure to acknowledge outright that the doctor is also a moral agent who should be held accountable for his actions. If a patient undergoes a harmful procedure, the moral responsibility for that action does not belong to the patient alone; it is shared by the doctor who performs it. Thus a doctor is in the position of deciding not simply whether a subject's choice is reasonable or morally justifiable, but whether he is morally justified in helping the subject accomplish it.
This alters the doctor's perspective in at least two important ways. First, as a moral agent, the doctor must ask not simply whether a change in a given state of affairs would be morally better, as a detached observer might ask, but whether or not he should become the agent of that change. Answers to these two questions need not be the same. If I were faced with a dying person in intractable pain who wanted to be a heart donor, I might well judge that all things considered, it would be better if he were to die. But this does not mean that I would be willing to kill him, or that I believe that I (or anyone) would be morally justified in doing so. It is an essential part of our notion of agency that we distinguish between that which we do and that which merely happens. It is not at all unreasonable for a doctor to think that it would be good for an event to take place but bad for him to bring it about.
To take another, slightly different example: opponents of a market trade in human organs often argue that an organ-market would exploit the poor, who would be tempted to alleviate their poverty at great risk to their health. Market defenders respond that the harms a poor person chooses to undergo should be a matter for that person himself to decide. A poor person might well think that it is better to be without a kidney than without money. But if I am the surgeon faced with doing the transplantation, this argument may still not win me over. Because even if I agree that the choice of harms should be up to the poor person himself, and that his choice to donate a kidney for money is reasonable, the fact is that I would not be responsible for his being poor, but I would be responsible for his being without a kidney. Greene Second, there is obviously a difference between choosing to risk harm to oneself and choosing to aid another person in risking it. It is partly for this reason that we might admire a person who chose to risk his life or health for the sake of others, but at the same time criticize the doctor or researcher who exposed him to that risk (1 2). It is not unreasonable, then, for doctors to be reluctant to expose willing subjects to the risk of harm, even while acknowledging the legitimacy of a system which allows subjects to take great risks. In fact, we might be justifiably suspicious of the character of a doctor who had no such reservations.
Third, it is important to acknowledge outright that when a person chooses to risk harm to himself, very often he is risking harm to others as well. When a person suffers, those who love him suffer, and when a person dies, he is missed. Any decision to encourage or assist a person who is willing to undergo a risky or harmful procedure must take into account these broader effects. (Of course, these effects touch the circle of people surrounding the potential beneficiary as well as those surrounding the person taking the risk.)
Fourth, at least part of the reason why we have reservations about patients who volunteer to be harmed is the possibility that other people might be taking advantage of the volunteer's selflessnessorgan recipients taking advantage of donors, researchers taking advantage of volunteers, and so on. For this reason, any system of practices in which people are likely to be harmed should be set up in ways that minimize this possibility. Of course, there is a sense in which any person who benefits from such a system is taking advantage of those who contribute to it, but it is possible to draw some limits. For example, it would be better to have a system of living organ transplantation in which nobody is able to make a financial profit from the procedure, including transplant surgeons and organ procurement agencies. This would limit incentives for anyone to encourage potential donors to take risks. 
